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I
INTRODUcTION

Among all the world's national assemblies, the United States Congress is
virtually unique in its legislative activism and productivity. Unlike Westminsterstyle parliamentary bodies, it writes, processes, and refines its own legislative
products, relying to a large degree on "in-house" resources of member
specialization and staff assistance. Congress's primacy as lawmaker is mandated
by the Constitution and validated by historical experience. Focusing upon the
legislative work of Congress follows Woodrow Wilson's admonition that we pay
attention to "what Congress actually does and how it does it, with all its duties
and all its occupations, with all its devices of management and resources of
power.

'1

Congress's agenda and workload shape not only the behavior and operations
of the Senate and House of Representatives but also the two chambers'
relationships with other governmental branches. Articles I and II of the
Constitution are devoted largely to outlining the interwoven lawmaking duties
of the legislative and executive branches-from initiation ("[The president] shall
from time to time ...recommend to [Congress's] Consideration such Measures
as he shall judge necessary and expedient., 2) to implementation ("[H]e shall
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. . . .")? Beginning with George
Washington, purposeful presidents have always tried to insert themselves into the
legislative process. Franklin D. Roosevelt and his successors institutionalized the
"legislative presidency"; 4 today's chief executives are expected to present
legislative agendas to Congress and to provide Capitol Hill allies with guidance
and leadership.
Congressional interactions with the judiciary are no less significant. Such
encounters are, on the whole, less conspicuous than those between Congress and
the White House, and until quite recently have received far less attention from
scholars and other serious observers. Yet the judicial branch is in large measure
a creature of Congress. Article III of the Constitution contains no less than four
grants of congressional discretion. Most importantly, the Supreme Court's
structure is left to statutory specification; its appellate jurisdiction is to be
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authorized "with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make."5 Mentioned, though not specified, are other federal courts "as the
6
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.",
The increasing interaction between Congress and the judiciary is now an
established phenomenon.
Congress is an active partner in shaping the
operational meaning of the constitutional text. Its actions frame constitutional
issues and produce a significant portion of the courts' casework agenda.
Congress or its individual members may participate in litigation as a party or an
amicus curiae (a friend of the court). Nor is Congress content to concede to
courts the last word on questions of constitutionality. On issues as diverse as
child labor, highway safety, flag burning, abortion, affirmative action, and
religious liberty, Congress has reacted to court holdings by trying to thwart,
sidestep, modify, or nullify them, or by simply ignoring them.' Approaching
questions of constitutionality or statutory interpretation, judges in turn remain
aware of Congress's reactive capacities and anticipated responses.'
It is my purpose in this article to offer general guidelines for understanding
how this task of framing and reviewing constitutional issues is approached by
today's senators and representatives. Several attributes of contemporary
congressional decisionmaking are especially relevant to understanding Congress's
role as constitutional interpreter. First, although fewer lawmakers have legal
backgrounds today, they tend to be careerists who rely on professional staffs to
advise them on technical matters. Second, the congressional workload continues
to expand in size and complexity. Third, Congress is organized and led by its
party organizations and their leaders; longstanding partisan and ideological
commitments affect Congress's legislative products. Finally, Congress is a
decentralized and pluralistic entity. Its members are motivated by a bewildering
variety of constituency and interest-group demands. Its detailed legislative work
is conducted mainly in its committee rooms. The committees respond to multiple
constituencies, speaking in many voices and sometimes with contradictory
messages. These attributes of Capitol Hill decisionmaking not only color
congressional consideration of constitutional issues, but also shape congressionaljudicial relations generally.
II
PROFESSIONALISM

The leading characteristic of modern legislators is that they tend to be
careerists. In the 103rd Congress (1993-1995), the average representative has
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served almost eleven years (5.4 House terms); the average senator has served
11.7 years (nearly two Senate terms). 9 Periodic high-turnover elections (for
example, 1964, 1974, 1992) temporarily dilute but do not dissolve the careerism
that pervades the contemporary Congress.
The prevalence of careerists on Capitol Hill has several consequences for
making laws and monitoring judicial developments. Most important, at any given
time, many members have experience with the issue at hand. This is especially
true of committee and subcommittee leaders. Second, careerism implies stability:
the House and Senate are relatively fixed institutions with strong traditions and
elaborate procedures. The presence of sizable numbers of senior members
means that sudden or drastic change is usually resisted. Observers and
newcomers alike soon learn that the two houses of Congress must be accepted
largely on their own terms and that their habitual ways of doing things can be
altered only with difficulty. Finally, members' longevity is accompanied by longstanding loyalties to certain political interests and policy outcomes, explaining
Congress's tenacity in pursuing favored interpretations in the face of opposition
from the courts or the executive branch. Examples of this vigor include both the
enactment of child labor provisions in 1938, nearly a generation after the
Supreme Court had declared them an unconstitutional exercise of Commerce
Clause authority, and the repeated efforts to resuscitate the "fairness doctrine"
after the Reagan Administration and the Federal Communications Commission
had pronounced it irreconcilable with the First Amendment's "marketplace of
ideas."1
Although the numbers are on the decline, a plurality of members of Congress
are recruited from the legal profession. 1 Lawyers dominate the two chambers'
Judiciary Committees. Nonlawyers rarely serve on the House Judiciary
Committee. On the Senate panel, however, political qualifications occasionally
prevail over a lack of legal experience in filling vacancies. One senator who was
offered a seat on the Judiciary Committee, described how then-chairman Strom
Thurmond (R-SC) appealed to him:
Strom Thurmond really wanted me on Judiciary. He offered to set up a
subcommittee and let me chair it. I'm not a lawyer. Thurmond said: "You
don't have to be a lawyer-you've got common sense. I'll hire you a lawyer.
If you don't like him, I'll hire you another one."12
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REP. 9 (1992).
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Following the 1992 elections, Chairman Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-DE) was
determined to recruit women members for his panel. Ultimately two women
were persuaded to serve: Carol Moseley-Braun of Illinois (the only lawyer
among the new women senators) and California's Diane Feinstein (a former
mayor of San Francisco who had several honorary law degrees but no legal
training).
Over the past several Congresses, then, nonlawyers of both parties have
served on the Senate committee. Yet the panel, like its House counterpart, is
essentially a lawyerly body: only four of its eighteen seats in the 103rd Congress
(1993-1995) are held by nonlawyers. This legal expertise influences Congress's
decisionmaking. Despite their concern over policy results, lawmakers retain a
fascination for procedural aspects of public issues, and often recast those issues
in legal language and concepts. Significantly, the primary formal setting for
gathering information is the committee hearing, which mirrors (if imprecisely)
judicial proceedings, and sometimes even includes oath-taking. Such hearings
may vent views on constitutional issues, which in turn may help frame judicial
proceedings. Congressional airing of campaign finance problems, for example,
will form an important part of the record if and when reform legislation is
enacted. The constitutionality of such legislation will turn not only on the
Court's prior analyses (primarily in Buckley v. Valeo13 ), but "will also be
informed by evidence that inadequately regulated campaign-financed practices
can subvert the integrity of the political process that is at the heart of our
democratic system of government."14 Evidence on such questions has been, and
will be, aired in detail in congressional hearings and floor debates.
Bill drafting is another phase of the legislative process that most clearly draws
upon legal expertise, including familiarity with constitutional provisions and
concepts. Yet the committees" handling of legal questions illustrates Richard F.
Fenno, Jr.'s dictum that "committees differ."" The interaction of members'
training and the committee subject matter lead committees into taking quite
diverse approaches to constitutional issues. In a study of three House
committees, for example, Mark E. Miller uncovered varying degrees of regard
for court interpretations.1 6 Interior and Insular Affairs (now Natural Resources) viewed issues in terms of constituent needs. The policy-driven Committee
on Energy and Commerce saw courts as simply another set of political players.
The Judiciary Committee's lawyer-members displayed a "lawyer-like culture and
deliberative style. ' 17 Although Miller's findings were drawn from interviews
with members and staffs, they indicate that the three committees bring differing
philosophical assumptions and decisionmaking premises to bear on the legal
13. 424 U.S. 1 (1974).
14. Gary S. Stein, The First Amendment and Campaign FinanceReform: A Timely Reconciliation,
44 RUTGERS L. REv. 743-95 (1992).
15.

RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMIrrEES 280 (1973).

16. Mark C. Miller, Congressional Committees and the Federal Courts: A Neo-Institutional
Perspective, 45 W. POL. Q. 949 (1992).
17. Id. at 961.
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aspects of their legislative drafting. Judiciary, for example, displays relatively
great deference to court holdings and hesitates to overturn them. In drafting its
regulatory statutes, Energy and Commerce, on the other hand, does so fully
expecting courts to flesh out its legislative language, and no doubt expects to
revisit controversial issues at some later date to endorse, reject, or modify
judicial interpretations.
Congress's approach to questions of constitutionality and legal interpretation
is conditioned by its members' attributes and career perspectives. The fact that
so many senators and representatives have been trained in the law, of course,
gives the two branches a common language for conducting a constitutional
dialogue. Yet elected lawmakers are apt to perceive questions of law rather
differently than do judges, or even lawyers practicing in the particular field in
question. Their collective judgments, as reflected in statutes, reports, and other
statements of congressional "policy," are primarily result-oriented, constituency
driven, and often characterized by vagueness, compromise, and inconsistencyall qualities that complicate the judiciary's tasks of interpretation and application.
III
AGENDAS AND WORKLOADS

Congress today confronts a number and variety of demands unmatched in all
but the most turbulent years of the past. In recent years, the legislative
workload has become increasingly diverse. Yet, the number of bills and
resolutions introduced and processed on Capitol Hill has declined since the peak
years of the 1970s. On the other hand, bills, resolutions, and enactments have
become longer and more complex. The 81st Congress (1949-1951) produced 906
statutes that averaged 2.5 pages in length; forty years later, the 101st Congress
(1989-1991) processed only 650 statutes, but they averaged nearly nine pages and
took up nearly twice as much space in the US. Code as the earlier Congress's
handiwork.18 Other legislative responsibilities-such as overseeing the executive
branch, processing nominations, and reviewing executive communications-have
also dramatically increased.
An increasingly frequent source of the lawmaking agenda is found in judicial
interpretations of existing statutory language. However elaborately they may be
structured, congressional enactments often define key public policy concepts in
broad terms, leaving it to the courts and executive agencies to apply and
elaborate upon them. In turn, judicial and executive readings of legislative
language may be examined, questioned, and even reversed in subsequent
enactments. There is every reason to believe that this form of lawmaking activity
has accelerated in recent years. Only twenty-one judicial rulings were overridden
between 1945 and 1957, according to one study. 9 A study of the 1967-1990
18. ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 326 (1994).
19. Note, CongressionalReversal of Supreme Court Decisions: 1945-1957, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1324,
1326 (1958).
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period, however, found that 121 of the Court's interpretation decisions had been
overridden, an average of ten per Congress.' The author of the second study
concluded that "congressional committees, in fact, carefully monitor Supreme
Court decisions," and that Congress is apt to override decisions of a closely
divided Court favoring conservative interpretations, decisions that rely on the
law's plain meaning, and decisions
that clash with positions taken by federal,
21
state, and local governments.
Bills and resolutions, moreover, constitute only part of the overall legislative
workload. Congress also receives a large volume of presidential messages and
executive reports of various kinds, some of which are mandated by law, others
of which are volunteered by the executive in an effort to shape the legislative
agenda. The overall trend over the past fifty years, and especially since the
1960s, has been one of dramatic growth, even though the numbers have subsided
somewhat in recent years. Because of its special constitutional duties, the Senate
historically has received more executive communications than the House,
although the gap is closing. Most communications are referred to the committees
having jurisdiction over the subject matter in question. Many congressional
committees receive almost as many executive communications as they do
legislative proposals; some committees receive far more.
Senate committees also have the time-consuming task of confirming
numerous federal appointments. The Senate Judiciary Committee considers the
growing numbers of law enforcement and judicial appointments, including Justice
Department executives, U.S. Attorneys and Marshals, and judges for various
federal courts. During the 100th Congress (1987-1989), for example, the
Committee considered 194 presidential nominations, or 22 percent of the total
nominations sent to the Senate. Fifty-one days of hearings were held, including
twelve days concerning Supreme Court nominee Robert H. Bork and three days
for Anthony Kennedy, the successor nominee.' These congressional-judicial
encounters can turn into highly publicized events, as in the contentious
confirmation hearings of Supreme Court nominees Bork (1987) and Clarence
Thomas (1991). Constitutional issues-abortion, affirmative action, and stare
decisis, for example-figure prominently in senators' questioning. Justice
Department nominees are subject to similar probes. Such concerns are not
confined to the Judiciary Committee: nominees for the Federal Communications
Commission (Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee) expect to be
queried about First Amendment and broadcast regulation, and nominees for the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Labor and Human Resources
Committee) invariably are challenged to give their views of affirmative action.
Implementation and oversight, as well as administrative and judicial
rulemaking, are functions that repeatedly prod congressional committees into
20. William N. Eskridge, Jr., OverridingSupreme CourtStatutory InterpretationDecisions, 101 YALE
L. J. 331, 338 (1991).
21. Id.
22. S. REP. No. 101-12, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1989).
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undertaking oversight hearings and investigations. The enactment of a law only
begins the policy-making process. Courts and administrative agencies may take
over the task of refining the policy, but always under Congress's watchful eye.
Louis Fisher observes,
What is "final" at one stage of our political development, may be reopened at
some later date, leading to revisions, fresh interpretations, and reversals of Court
doctrines. Through this process of interaction among the branches, all three
institutions are able to expose weaknesses, hold excesses in check, and gradually
forge a consensus on constitutional issues.'

Reauthorizations of agencies and programs are obvious occasions for examining
They also raise constitutional iseffectiveness and voicing complaints.
Department), fetal tissue research
(Justice
busing
example,
to,
for
sues-relating
(National Institutes of Health), abortion counseling (Health and Human
Services), and broadcast license standards (Federal Communications Commission).24 With the breadth and reach of modem government, oversight remains
burdensome even if few new statutes are produced. In any event, this oversight
bears a close relationship to lawmaking because it flows from previously enacted
statutes and continues to influence how those statutes are implemented and
evaluated.
Confronting such a vast subject matter and relentless workload demands,
Congress cannot devote systematic or consistent attention to issues raised in the
federal establishment, even those that pose constitutional questions. "Most of
what agencies do, at the level of the myriad individual actions that comprise the
daily life of any department or agency, is simply not knowable by Congress. '
Thus, as Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz have argued, Congress's
oversight strategy falls short of "police-patrol" scrutiny: systematic, proactive
review of agencies' activities.2 6 Rather, legislators normally settle for the
reactive "fire-alarm" approach, in which their attention is triggered by
constituencies through "a system of rules, procedures, and informal practices that
enable individual citizens and organized interest groups to examine decisions,.
• . to charge executive agencies with violating congressional goals, and to seek
remedies from agencies, courts, and Congress itself." 27 The principle applies as
much to lawmakers' review of court holdings as to their oversight of administrative actions. The attention Congress devotes to constitutional questions, in other
words, depends heavily upon the political and institutional context within which
the question is raised.

23. FISHER, supra note 10, at 275.
24. On FCC application of affirmative action to licensees, see FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 7, at
290-91.
25. CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., SIGNALS FROM THE HILL: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND
THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL REGULATION 19 (1988).
26. Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked; Policy
PatrolsVersus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. Sc. 165 (1984).

27.

Id, supra note 26, at 166.
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IV
PARTISANSHIP

Since the early nineteenth century, members of Congress have tended to be
partisan and ideological loyalists, and Congress's chambers have been in large
part organized and led by the political parties. Partisanship is alive and well on
Capitol Hill; party affiliation remains the strongest single correlate of members'
voting decisions, which in recent years has reached surprisingly high levels.'
Moreover, despite the fact that U.S. political parties are widely regarded as "big
tents" covering diverse viewpoints, partisanship in the two chambers is closely
linked to durable policy commitments and ideological predispositions.
Since the New Deal era, Congress has been a bastion of Democratic Party
control-excepting two Republican Congresses (1947-1949 and 1953-1955) and
six years of Senate control (1981-1987). Democratic margins have ranged from
overwhelming (1933-1939, 1959-1965, 1975-1981) to relatively close. With
Republican control of the White House-and judicial nominations-in the 19691976 and 1981-1992 periods, ideological tensions between the legislative and
judicial branches were to be expected. This Republican control may help explain
a congressional tendency to overturn "conservative" Supreme Court decisions
through enactments such as the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Religious
Liberty Restoration Act of 1993.29
Parties control all assignments to the standing committees. Each of the four
congressional party caucuses (House and Senate Democrats and Republicans)
has a Committee on Committees to assign caucus members to committees. The
assignments are ratified by the respective chambers. The majority party names
the chairpersons of all committees and subcommittees and enjoys a majority of
seats on virtually all panels. The parties' share of committee seats roughly
parallels their strength in the full chamber.
Control of committees is critical because these work groups are the
gatekeepers of congressional policy making. Few policies are enacted without
committee support; those that are enacted bear the framework and language laid
down in committee markup sessions. Thus, domination of committees'
memberships leads to control of the legislative agenda.'

A. The Judiciary Committees and their Parent Chambers
Although by no means the sole arenas of constitutional interpretation, the
Judiciary Committees deserve special attention here. Not only do they play

28.

NoRMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THOMAS E. MANN & MICHAEL J. MALBIN, VITAL STATISTICS ON

CONGRESS 1991-1992, at 189-90 (1992).
29. Solimine & Walker, supra note 8, at 447-50. See also Ira C. Lupu, Statutes in Constitutional
Orbit, 79 VA. L. REv. 1 (1993).
30. EvANS, supra note 12, at 60ff.
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pivotal roles in authorizing and reviewing judicial bodies, they are also among
the most partisan committees on Capitol Hill.
Partisan lines often are sharply drawn in legal and judicial controversies.
Because the jurisdictions of the two Judiciary Committees embrace many
(though by no means all) of these issues, domination of these panels is a partisan
objective. The committees were the arenas for the civil rights battles of the
1950s and 1960s; the House panel in 1974 voted articles of impeachment against
President Richard Nixon. Since then, the panels have been the scene of conflicts
over such divisive social issues as abortion, affirmative action, school prayer, flag
burning, and the rights of criminal defendants. Especially during the years of
divided-party control of the government, such issues have focused unprecedented
attention upon the Senate's confirmation of judicial nominees.
Not surprisingly, then, the parties take pains to shape the two Judiciary
Committees to their divergent policy needs. When making committee assignments, party leaders consider not only members' personal preferences but also
the demands of their parties' key constituencies-for example, regional,
economic, or ideological lobby groups. The conservative oligarchs who
dominated Congress through the mid-1960s tried to maintain the Judiciary
Committees as protectors against civil rights legislation; fierce opposition in the
Senate Judiciary Committee was the reason early civil rights initiatives were
directed toward the Commerce Committees through bills directed at discrimination in interstate commerce. Increasingly, however, liberals were drawn to the
Judiciary panels by the prospect of working on civil rights and other progressive
legislation.
The Judiciary Committees' attractiveness to policy entrepreneurs declined in
the 1980s as issues of constitutional interpretation became increasingly divisive.
House Democratic leaders made assignments that assured the Committee would
kill constitutional amendments and other measures desired by conservatives on
such subjects as school prayer, abortion, budget procedures, and term limits.
Party leaders have encountered difficulty in attracting members, and in the early
1980s several members attempted to leave the Committee to escape divisive
social issues under its jurisdiction.31
When Republicans captured the Senate in 1981, the Judiciary Committee was
a singular target for conservative takeover.32 By this time one of the more
liberal Senate panels, Judiciary was holding up conservative initiatives on busing,
school prayer, criminal law, abortion policy, and other social issues. Spurred by
fellow conservatives, the new chairman, Strom Thurmond (SC), recruited a
conservative majority for his panel. He urged three conservative freshmen to
seek seats on the Committee. Then he neutralized a senior Republican liberal,
Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (Md.), by both abolishing one subcommittee

31.

STEVEN S. SMIrH & CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING, CoMMITTEEs IN CONGRESS 103 (1990).

32. Roger H. Davidson & Walter J. Oleszek, Changingthe Guard in the U.S. Senate, 9 LEGIS. STUD.
Q. 635, 649 (1984).
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the Marylander was in line to chair and shifting the jurisdiction of another on
which he served. Constitutional issues were meanwhile safely placed in
conservatives' hands. Thurmond's actions pulled the Committee back near the
chamber's ideological center, helping him control the Committee's agenda and
combat the liberals' delaying tactics. "Because of its ideological complexion and
the prevalence of delaying tactics," Evans writes, "the Judiciary Committee was
very much a 'microcosm' of the full Senate during the years of Republican control."33 After Democrats recaptured the Senate in 1987, however, the panel
shifted leftward again.

Figure 1:
SUPPORT FOR "CONSERVATIVE COALITION":
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JUDICIARY COMM1ITEE
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In short, party control has pushed the Judiciary Committees leftward or
rightward, as the case may be. 4 The ideological stance of the Committees
compared to their parent chambers in the 1959-1989 period is shown in Figures
1 and 2.35 During the era when Congress was dominated by the conservative
alliance of southern Democrats and Republicans, the two panels actually stood
close to the ideological center of their respective chambers, although Committee
members tended to favor states' rights and resist racial equality. When liberal
Democrats controlled both chambers (approximately 1965-1981), the Committees
shifted substantially to the left of the chamber average. This situation has
recurred in recent Congresses. The Senate Judiciary Committee, however,
shifted back toward the center when Republicans controlled the chamber (19811987).
Figure 2:
SUPPORT FOR "CONSERVATIVE COALMON":

SENATE AND SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1959-1989

1959

1969

1977

Committee Republicans
Committee Average

1983

1981

-

At

1985

1987

Committee Democrats
Senate Average

34. The ideological measure used here is the members' "conservative coalition score": their
propensity to support positions taken by an alliance of southern Democrats and Republicans.
"Conservative coalition" votes are defined as recorded votes in which a majority of voting southern
Democrats and a majority of voting Republicans oppose the stand taken by a majority of voting northern
Democrats. This rough but widely-used indicator of liberalism-conservatism was developed by
Congressional Quarterly and is discussed by ORNSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 28, at 190-92, 202-12.
35. Figures 1 and 2 are drawn from ORNSTEIN, AT AL., supra note 28, 204-12.
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B. Intra-Committee Conflicts
Within the Judiciary Committees, the ideological gap is wider than in the two
chambers as a whole. Judiciary Democrats tend to be more liberal than their
fellow partisans, while Judiciary Republicans are to the right of their GOP
Self-selection may partially account for this phenomenon:
colleagues.
Ideologically committed members are drawn to arenas that allow them to voice
their views and pursue their goals. Party leaders add to the polarization by
ensuring that "reliable" partisans are given seats on Judiciary.3 6 A student of
the Senate panel in the 1980s described members' preferences as "polarized and
entrenched"; decision making was "often highly partisan and rife with conflict."' 37 The same could be said of the House Committee.
Intra-committee polarization persists, as the figures presented in Table 1
indicate. 38 As noted earlier, as long as Democrats hold majorities in the House
or Senate chambers, the Judiciary Committees are more liberal than the
chambers' membership as a whole. The Republicans, whether in majority or
minority, are also careful to ensure the conservative loyalty of their committee
members. (Although in recent years the Committees' Republicans have edged
nearer to their party's mean, that is no doubt due in part to the party's overall
rightward shift.) Within both Committees, therefore, there is a wide ideological
gap between the two parties. The gap becomes a yawning chasm in the House
Civil and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, where both parties guard their
interests in seeking to influence constitutional amendments. In 1991 subcommittee Democrats gave an average of eleven percent support to the "conservative
coalition," while their Republican counterparts gave ninety-three percent. The
Judiciary Committees' partisan and ideological character affects the politics of
constitutional interpretation, as the examples in Part V illustrate.

36. Shepsle found no overall ideological "bias" in House Democrats' assignments, but that does not
preclude leadership efforts to shape particular committees to favor clientele groups. See KENNETH A.
SHEPSLE, THE GIANT JIGSAW PUZZLE:

DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS IN THE MODERN

HOUSE 222-24 (1978).
37. Evans, supra note 12, at 60.
38.

ORNSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 28, at 21.
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Table 139
IDEOLOGY ON THE JUDICIARY COMMITITEES:
"CONSERVATIVE COALITION" SCORES OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS

House of Representatives

Committee Republicans
House Republicans
House Democrats
Committee Democrats

1989

1990

1991

90%
87
40
24

86%
85
40
19

87%
90
41
30

1989

1990

1991

88%
85
42
30

83%
83
40
27

87%
84
43
32

Senate

Committee Republicans
House Republicans
House Democrats
Committee Democrats

V
INSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM:

COMMITITEES AND CONSTITUENCIES

As a policy-making institution, Congress is characterized not only by the scale
of its workload and the careerism and partisanship of its members, but also by
the number and variety of its structures and procedures. The Constitution
confers most internal organizational decisions upon the two chambers. Given
this broad conferral of authority, today's elaborate structures are the product of
historical evolution.'
Organizationally, the House and Senate are mature
institutions with large bodies of settled rules, procedures, and precedents for
conducting their business.
Congress's organizational complexity is demonstrated most dramatically by
the two chambers' division of labor through their committee systems. Today

39. "Conservative coalition" scores represent the proportion of votes on which members voted in
agreement with the position of the conservative coalition. Conservative coalition votes are those on
which a majority of Northern Democrats voted against a majority of Southern Democrats and
Republicans, that is, the conservative coalition. See ORNSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 28, at 201-212 (1992).
Scores reported here, which were recomputed to eliminate the effect of absences, were originally
reported in Congressional Quarterly. 48 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 58-60 (Jan. 6, 1990); 48 CONG. Q. WKLY
REP. 4192-95, 4218-21 (Dec. 22, 1990); 49 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 3759-97 (Dec. 28, 1991).
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
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there are sixteen standing committees in the Senate and twenty-two in the
House." This, however, is only the tip of the iceberg. At the beginning of the
103rd Congress (1993-1995), House committees were divided into nearly 117
subcommittees. The House also had a select committee with three subcommittees. The Senate had three select or special committees; its standing committees
had eighty-six subcommittees. Congress also had five joint Senate-House
committees. In total, there were almost 250 work groups in 1993-not counting
party committees, voting blocs, informal caucuses, and the like. Congressional
pluralism extends not only to these work groups but to virtually all of its
organizational entities. Staff structures, for example, have developed in an
uncoordinated fashion, as staff and support agencies have been established over
time in response to specific needs. The complexity and pluralism of the
congressional establishment often assures a varied response to questions of
constitutionality.
Judicial relations are subject to the same pluralism and decentralization that
marks so much congressional decisionmaking. The prime responsibilities
regarding courts and the legal system, of course, fall to the Senate and House
Committees on the Judiciary. Their jurisdictions extend to such matters as
judicial proceedings generally, federal courts and judges, civil liberties,
constitutional amendments, immigration and naturalization, patents, copyrights,
and trademarks, interstate compacts, and claims against the United States.42
Proposing a constitutional amendment is the most decisive way of to resolve
a judicial-congressional dispute. Historically, no less than seven amendments
(Eleventh, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Sixteenth, Nineteenth, TWenty-Fourth, and
Twenty-Sixth) either overturned or effectively nullified prior Supreme Court
rulings. Proposed amendments on abortion, flag burning, and school prayer were
designed to overturn Supreme Court decisions. Thus the relevant Judiciary
subcommittees, including the House Civil and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, and the Senate Constitution Subcommittee, are inevitably targeted by groups
bent on altering the Constitution, preventing such alterations, or affecting its
interpretation.
Proposed constitutional amendments rarely succeed because of the difficulty
of the constitutional amending process; statutory revisions are a more feasible
and frequent response to judicial rulings. In the decade following Roe v.
Wade,4 3 for example, Congress enacted some thirty statutes dealing with
abortion-all of them involving restrictions of one form or another. Some
merely stated a congressional finding of fact that human life begins at conception; others would have limited federal court power to deal with the issue.
Compared with a constitutional amendment, such legislative remedies were

41.

51 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. (May 1, 1993).

42.
43.

House Rule X, cl. 1 (m); Senate Rule XXV, cl. 1 (1).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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relatively cost-free; some were mainly symbolic." The Civil Rights Act of 1991
addressed, clarified, or reversed prior Court rulings in no less than eleven
separate cases.45

Issues affecting courts and the legal system are not, of course, confined to the
Judiciary Committees. The nation's federal statutes, after all, are within the
province of every committee of the House and Senate that reports legislation.
Committee actions affect not only the content of those laws but also their
interpretation and implementation, and the involvement of the legal profession
and the workload of federal courts. A number of committees, moreover, have
jurisdictional responsibilities that can involve constitutional interpretation.
Among these subjects are military law, international law, government regulation
of all types, election law, and organization of the executive branch. The 1987
annual defense authorization bill, for example, provided the vehicle for
overturning Goldman v. Weinberger,' in which the Supreme Court upheld an
Air Force regulation forbidding an Orthodox Jew from wearing his yarmulke
while in uniform. The House and Senate floor debate not only illustrates
Congress's responsiveness to constituency pressures but "provides impressive
evidence that members of Congress are fully capable of considering constitutional rights and giving greater protection than is available in the federal courts." 47
Because they differ in personnel, jurisdictions, and constituencies, committees approach constitutional issues with varying decision premises and policy
concerns. The Judiciary Committees, because their membership and subject
matter are dominated by the legal professions, harbor a special concern for the
nuances of constitutional interpretation. In contrast, policy committees (like
Energy and Commerce) and constituency-oriented panels (like Interior and
Insular Affairs/Natural resources) view constitutional questions in a more
practical framework'l "The fate of various court decisions in Congress," Miller
concludes, "may in fact depend on which congressional committee takes
jurisdiction over the issues."'49
Two cases cited by Miller illustrate how differently two House committees
approached First Amendment holdings of the Supreme Court.5 0 Energy and
Commerce, faced with a June 1989 decision striking down most of a law it had
drafted to outlaw so-called dial-a-porn telephone services,5 acted a month later,

44.

See Roger H. Davidson, Procedures and Politics in Congress, in THE ABORTION DISPUTE AND

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 30 (Gilbert Y. Steiner ed., 1983). A more recent compilation of selected post1973 statutes is found in BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG & DAVID M. O'BRIEN,

ABORTION AND

AMERICAN POLITICS 109-113 (1993).
45. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). See Joan Biskupic, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 3620-22 (Dec. 7, 1991).
46. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
47. The commentary is from Louis Fisher, One of the Guardians Some of the Time, in IS THE
SUPREME COURT THE GUARDIAN OF THE CONsTrruriON? 15 (Robert Licht ed., 1993).
48. See Miller, supra note 16, at 963.
49. Id. at 963.
50. Id. at 958.
51. Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
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with little debate and no hearings, to strangle the industry through regulatory
language added to an annual budget reconciliation bill. Judiciary reacted much
more cautiously to the Court's July 1989 holding that burning the U.S. flag was
protected political speech under the First Amendment. 2 Facing intense
political pressure, the Committee nonetheless held five hearings collecting the
views of members of Congress, decorated war veterans, and constitutional
scholars. These witnesses advocated diverse courses of action: (1) do nothing;
(2) amend the constitution; or (3) amend the existing flag desecration statute to
conform to the Court's opinion. No more than five weeks after the Court had
spoken, the Committee decided upon the statutory option and reported
legislation intended to "protect the physical integrity of American flags in a
manner consistent with [the Supreme Court's decision]."5 3 Before choosing the
middle course of action, the panel "followed its usual pattern of carefully
considering all sides of an issue and judiciously weighing all the alternatives
before attempting to overturn or modify a federal court decision."
A. Authorization versus Appropriation
One form of overlap of Senate and House Committee jurisdictions is between
the authorizing committees that have policy and oversight authority over
agencies and their programs, and the appropriations committees that recommend
funding levels. Policy questions embodying constitutional interpretations may be
raised in either arena, even though regular appropriations bills are not supposed
to include "legislation." When committees, following Roe v. Wade, were slow to
include antiabortion provisions in regular authorization or appropriation bills,
such provisions were added as floor amendments called "Hyde amendments,"
after their most prominent advocate, Representative Henry J. Hyde (R-III)"
Applied to various forms of governmental aid and services, such amendments
dramatically slashed federal financing of abortions. In upholding the amendments in 1980, the Supreme Court's majority found that the amendments
violated neither the Fifth Amendment's due process or equal protection
guarantees nor the First Amendment's establishment of religion clause.5 6 The
decision did not mention an amicus curiae brief filed by over 200 members of
Congress arguing that the congressional funding process should be regarded as
a separation of powers issue that the Court should avoid.
Constitutional disputes stalled annual Justice Department authorization bills
during the 1980s, in several instances forcing the department to operate solely
on the authority of its funding bills. The fiscal 1983 authorization, for example,
passed the Senate, but with a restrictive antibusing amendment that could not get
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53.
54.
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Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
H.R. Rep. No. 1015, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
See Miller, supra note 16, at 958.
See Davidson, supra note 44, at 37-41.
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past the House Judiciary Committee.5 7 Whereas "legislation" is prohibited in
regular appropriations bills, no such restriction applies to emergency funding bills
that are continuing resolutions, and which were used frequently in the 1980s.
Factions competed to attach Justice Department provisions to these bills through
floor amendments, although this route was greatly restricted by a 1983 House
rules change.
B. Multiple Referrals to Committees
Substantive jurisdictional overlaps have been accommodated in both
chambers by procedures that enable committees to share responsibilities for
broad-scale measures. The House of Representatives introduced its present
multiple referral procedure in 1975; by the mid-1980s, nearly a quarter of the
workload of House committees, on average, consisted of bills and resolutions
shared with one or more other panels.5" The House Judiciary Committee, with
its relatively high volume of legislation, receives large numbers of multiply
referred measures, although they account for only about twelve percent of the
panel's total referrals. Compared to other House committees, the Judiciary
Committee's jurisdiction is relatively focused and compartmentalized. At the
same time, it lays claim to a variety of generally applicable issues that impinge
upon the legal system-for example, antitrust laws, the federal criminal code, and
Article III courts. In this area, the Judiciary Committee shares a significant
number of major bills with other committees, most notably with Energy and
Commerce, Ways and Means, Foreign Affairs, Banking, and Education and
Labor. In the Senate, multiple referrals of legislation are less common than in
the House, because customs and procedures permit committee cross-fertilization
through informal negotiations, floor amendments, and other devices. Small but
significant numbers of bills and resolutions, however, are referred by unanimous
consent to two or more Senate committees-amounting to roughly five percent
of all referrals in recent years.59 As with its House counterpart, the Senate
Judiciary Committee received a sizable number of multiple referrals during the
1980s, although these amounted to no more than three percent of the panel's
large volume of legislation. Bills were most often shared with committees on the
Budget, Governmental Affairs, and Finance. Judiciary and Finance, for example,
shared responsibility over unfair competition in foreign trade through the
former's antitrust jurisdiction and the latter's international trade jurisdiction.
A Case Study: The Equal Access Question. Overlapping committee
jurisdictions and tactical use of multiple referrals were both illustrated by

57. Nadine Cohodas, House, Senate Committees Approve JusticeAuthorization, 41 CONG. Q. WKLY
REP. 967 (1983). For a description of the dispute surrounding the fiscal 1987 authorization, see Nadine
Cohodas, House Panel. Meese at Odds Over '87 Funding, 44 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 922 (1986).
58. Roger H. Davidson et al., One Bill, Many Committees: Multiple Referrals in the U.S. House of
Representatives, 13 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 3 (1988).
59. For relevant figures for the Senate, see Roger H. Davidson, Multiple Referral of Legislation in
the US. Senate, 14 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 375-92 (1989).
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procedures invoked in 1984 to pass the so-called "equal access" bill. Equal
access refers to the use of public school facilities, before or after class hours, by
non-school-sponsored, secular or religious groups. Sometimes called "Son of
School Prayer," the bill was a fallback measure favored by those who supported
a constitutional amendment permitting prayer in the schools. Given the political
complexion of the Judiciary Committees, especially that of the House panel in
the 1981-1986 period, a school prayer amendment was unlikely. On March 20,
1984, the Senate rejected a proposed constitutional amendment in part because
of expected fierce opposition from liberals on the House Judiciary Committee.
With the constitutional amendment foreclosed, House Education and Labor
Chairman Carl Perkins (D-Ky.), and cosponsor Don Bonker (D-Wash.), drafted
an alternative remedy' written to bypass the Judiciary Committee and fall
solely within the jurisdiction of Perkins's committee. Within two weeks, the
Perkins bill was reported by his committee in a 30-3 vote. 61 Not only was it
endorsed by a broad spectrum of individuals and groups, including many who
opposed classroom prayer, but it was "viewed by many in Congress as a political
safety net that may protect them from the ire of constituents angered by the
'
defeat of the school prayer amendment."62
In a countermove, the chief House Judiciary Committee foe of the bill, Don
Edwards (D-Calif.), who chaired the Civil and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, drafted his own bill,63 providing access to public schools for any voluntary
student group but barring religious services on school grounds, even if they were
voluntary. Edwards persuaded Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill (D-Mass.) to delay
a floor vote on the Perkins bill and unsuccessfully endeavored to schedule a
Democratic Caucus meeting on the issue to delay it further. "They have a lot
going for them," he said of Perkins and his allies. "We just had to buy time. '
Said Perkins of his adversary: "He advocates taking full advantage of the rules,
I will not even call it a diversionary tactic."'65 When the vote was finally taken
on May 15, Edwards won a temporary victory. Although the House voted 270
to 151 in favor of the Perkins-Bonker bill, that fell eleven votes short of the twothirds needed to pass the measure under a suspension of the rules-the route
Perkins had chosen to obtain an early vote and prevent the addition of any
amendments to the bill.
The next episode in the drama occurred in the Senate, where Mark 0.
Hatfield (R-Ore.) attached an equal access amendment to an uncontroversial
bill' to upgrade mathematics and science education. On June 27, the 1984
amendment was adopted by an 88-11 Senate vote. When the Senate's
60. H.R. 5345, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
61. H.R. REP. No. 710, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
62. Id.
63. H.R. 5349, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
64. Nadine Cohodas, Two House Veterans Scrap on Issue of School Access, 42 CONG. Q. WKLY
REP. 1103-04 (1984).
65. Id.
66. S.1285, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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nongermane equal access amendment came back to the House, Chairman
Perkins moved to go to conference with the Senate. Speaker O'Neill refused to
recognize Perkins, explaining that the chair had referred a portion of the Senate
amendment to Perkins's committee and to the Judiciary Committee. "In the
opinion of the Parliamentarian, as stated to the Speaker, the Committee on the
Judiciary has partial jurisdiction over a portion of the Senate Bill. This was a
'
nongermane amendment."67
Perkins retorted: "I do not want to see this bill sent to a burial committee."
In a one-minute speech, he asserted that the bill did not fall within
Judiciary's jurisdiction and threatened to invoke the Calendar Wednesday
procedure to take the measure to conference.69
Perkins achieved a procedural victory through his threat to invoke Calendar
Wednesday procedures to consider the Senate amendment to H.R. 1310, the
Emergency Mathematics and Science Act and Education and Jobs Act.7" After
being denied his unanimous consent request for consideration of H.R. 1310 on
July 24, 1984, Perkins moved to suspend the rules and agree to a resolution
making in order on Wednesday, July 25, 1984, the consideration of the Senate
amendment to H.R. 1310. Then-Majority Whip Thomas S. Foley (D-Wash.)
requested unanimous consent to postpone the debate and vote until July 25,
thereby preserving for Perkins the Calendar Wednesday option.
On July 25, the House adopted H.R. 554 by voice vote without debate,
thereby suspending the rules for the purpose of considering Title VIII of the
Senate amendment to H.R. 1310. Title VIII, the Equal Access Act, was passed
337-77. The remainder of the bill was approved 393-15, sending the measure to
the President, who signed it into law71 on August 11, 1984. Six years later, the
Supreme Court upheld the "equal access" statute.72
As demonstrated by the equal access bill, Congress's overlapping committee
jurisdictions provide multiple avenues for expressing members' views on sensitive
constitutional issues. A frontal assault on the Supreme Court's school prayer
doctrine was thwarted by House Judiciary's liberal tilt. The related equal access
issue, which was construed as educational policy, offered an alternative way of
getting Congress on the record on the matter. The effect was to shift the
measure from a legally minded committee to a more result-oriented one, and to
transform the issue from one of constitutional doctrine to one of educational
policy.

67. 130 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 19770 (June 28, 1984).
68. Id.
69. Under House procedures, every Wednesday standing committees may call up measures that they
have reported but that have not been granted rules by the Rules Committee. The procedure is rarely
used and is routinely dispensed with by unanimous consent. WALTER OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL
PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 136-38 (3d ed. 1989).
70. H.R. 1310, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
71. Education for Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 98-377, 98 Stat. 1267 (1984).
72. Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
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The equal access bill demonstrated many of the attributes of congressional
consideration of constitutional issues. It called into play partisan, ideological,
and constituency motivations. It illustrated the differing responses of committees
with overlapping jurisdiction-Judiciary's more legalistic approach contrasted
with Education and Labor's focus upon policy results. Finally, it stands as a
reminder of the range of responses available to Congress in responding to
constitutional questions.
VI
CONCLUSION

The attributes of lawmakers and the lawmaking process affect not only
Congress's legislative productivity but also how Congress treats constitutional
issues. Its pluralistic, uncoordinated, and sometimes contradictory responses to
constitutional questions reflect the complexity of Congress's structure. Congress
rarely speaks with a single, clear, unambiguous voice.
In approaching such questions, Congress and the courts share a common
attribute-namely the prevalence of legal training-but the barriers between the
two branches are formidable and seem to be widening. The number of lawyerlegislators in Congress is on the decrease, and, in any event, lawmaking and
judging careers seem to follow ever more divergent paths. Although Congress
relies heavily upon legal expertise, mainly through committee and support agency
staffs, lawmakers tend to be result-oriented, often interpreting constitutional
language in terms of its impact on specific constituency interests.
High levels of activity and burgeoning demands dictate congressional
response to public issues. As always, lawmakers are torn between the conflicting
pressures of Capitol Hill politics and the gravitational pull of their home
constituencies. Rising demands from both sectors make it virtually impossible
for senators and representatives to devote sustained attention to substantive
problems or issues. The two chambers have responded to these burgeoning work
loads and scheduling dilemmas by delegating to staff aides the mechanics of
legislative research and drafting.
Partisan and ideological allegiances are as divisive as ever and are especially
salient in congressional responses to pressing constitutional questions.
Committees are the primary processors of legislation and monitors of judicial
developments; their jurisdictions are scattered and overlapping. Because their
memberships, jurisdictions, and constituencies differ, the committees themselves
differ in their approaches to constitutional questions and their degree of
deference to judicial interpretations. The committee system also offers multiple
points of access, allowing contending factions to choose alternative routes to
achieve the same policy objective. Both the committee system's pluralism and
its redundancy are illustrated by the case of the equal access bill. Moreover,
committees these days are increasingly more likely to combine their efforts to
produce legislative packages or omnibus bills.
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The bills and resolutions passed by Congress, the reports and other
documents it produces, and indeed Congress's responses to constitutional
decentralization,
questions, bear all the trademarks of Congress itself:
partisanship, constituency loyalty, result-mindedness, bicameralism, deliberateness, and a tendency to obfuscate and compromise. These attributes shape the
institution's distinctly pluralistic and instrumental approach to the Constitution
itself.

